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Book Review
William W. Bassett*
The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges
Renard, Joseph T. Delos, edited by Albert Broderick. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Pp. xxv, 370. Cloth: $15.00.
The procedural framework of the legal system occupies a central position in
recent studies of contemporary jurisprudence and the comparative philos-
ophy of law. The processes of law, as Paul Freund recently remarked, rather
than its particular judgments or results, offer insights which "may teach us
to cope with the great antinomies of our aspirations: liberty and order;
privacy and knowledge; stability and change; security and responsibility."'
The legal enterprise, defined in Henry M. Hart's studies around the prin-
ciple of institutionalized decision and settlement, is a creative force in society.
Law serves persons existing in radical interdependence by procedures or-
dained duly to direct and domesticate power. The legal order is a positive
context for the developing interrelationships of rights and duties between in-
dividuals and organizations within the national state and the international
community.
Focusing upon the centrality of a progressive and societal role of law,
jurists are increasingly turning from treatises preoccupied with systematic
conceptualization and codification to a methodology of interdisciplinary
analysis. Illustrative of this trend are the recent studies of Freund, Lon L.
Fuller's The Anatomy of Law and two very significant studies of the judicial
process, Alexander Bickel's The Supreme Court and the Idea of Justice and
Schubert and Danelski's Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural
Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West.
The present collection of essays taken from the writings of Maurice Hau-
riou, Georges Renard and Joseph T. Delos brings welcome light upon the
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American scene. Careful editing and meticulous annotation make this voT-
ume a valuable contribution to the analytic endeavor. An equally worthy
translation serves to convey with clarity and precision the thinking of the
great French jurists as they explored the dynamics of social interaction to
establish law and right upon the institutional foundations of society.
Roscoe Pound classified the work of Maurice Hauriou, Dean of the Fac-
ult6 de Droit of Toulouse in the first quarter of the century, as neo-scholastic
sociological jurisprudence. What Kant attributed in the development of
legal obligation to will, Marx to economic wants, Post to instincts, Weber to
values and William James to desires and demands in conflict, Pound says
Hauriou ascribed to institutions.2 Pound found this a dangerous shift of the
basic legal unit away from the individual man. He feared submergence in
the demands of the corporate state. Yet it is now clear that Hauriou
compensated by a rich personalism which enabled him to strike a theoretical
balance that Pound had failed to see.
Hauriou sought an explanation for the developing legal order that would
avoid both an individualistic disintegration in the fictionalized citadel of
contract and denigration of legal personality by the equation of legal order
with the state. For this reason he repeatedly criticized Lon Duguit, who he
thought had used sociological theory in such a way as to jeopardize the very
integrity of personal rights as a creation of the mass of consciences. This
he thought would leave unprotected the rights of any dissident minority.
But with equal vigor he opposed Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law as a for-
malistic construct unrelated to the dynamics of the social factor. Both ex-
tremes failed to account for the complexities or the evolution of positive law
by reducing them to a single explanation, a "monism" as he termed it. The
individual, Hauriou believed, is antecedent to both law and state, not in
the privity of a shielded subjectivity, but as a social being, as needing for
growth and fulfillment the structure of institutionalized relationships.
Hauriou's studies of French administrative law, of which he is the acknow-
ledged master, led him to the theory of the institution. The integration of
custom, contract and legislation in a processive and relational matrix of
positive law has been further developed by his two most important disci-
ples, Georges Renard, formerly professor of public law at Nancy, and Joseph
T. Delos, professor of sociology and law at Lille. They have gone beyond
Hauriou into a general institutional theory or philosophy of law. Of the
three, Delos alone, who contributes a retrospective essay to this volume, is
still alive.
2. 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 342 (1959).
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Man in his natural sociability is the basic datum, the principal "social
fact" in a galaxy of :interrelated phenomena which supply the concrete con-
cern for justice in positive law. In the view of the institutionalists, these
social facts tend to coalesce in structured institutions under the influence
of directive ideas. The rational element or guiding idea is the leading reason
for cooperation in the formation of organizations and the vital, moving force
of institutions. Hauriou defined institution basically as:
: * * an idea of a work or enterprise that is realized and endures
juridically in a social milieu; for the realization of this idea, a
power is organized that equips it with organs; on the other hand,
among the members of the social group interested in the realiza-
tion of the idea, manifestations of communion occur that are di-
rected by the organs of the power and regulated by procedures.3
The role of authority within any institution is to further the attainment of
this organizing and directive idea. The exercise of authority, however, de-
pends on the observable stage of ideational development, wherein the role of
sociology is pivotal. Social facts supply the stuff of positive law, but the di-
recting idea remains normative. Progress in society depends upon the ra-
tional development of basic ideas in the light of critical moral principles bear-
ing upon the values of order, justice and liberty, and the need procedurally
to balance power with power to compensate for human weaknesses.
The legal enterprise is thus the art of achieving the idea, the common
personal and social objectives of interdependent men and institutions. Law
is not only deductive, but primarily practical. Hauriou cites favorably the
definition of Celsus that law is an art, ars boni et aequi. Utilizing the data of
the social and behavioral sciences, law properly functions to the attainment
of fundamental moral ideas for the common good of society. These
moral ideas can be verified by the observation of the reality of men living
in society.
As Delos remarks, this means preeminently a return to reality, to an ob-
jective natural law based upon the observation of human nature, not as an
abstract notion or concept, but as that which is "most real and most living
in each one, the principle of all the instincts, vital forces, intellectual, moral
or physical needs, that give birth to the life of society and provide it with its
ends." 4
Social relationships are real. They constitute an "objective reality, exterior
to the individuals who are the support and the terms of these relationships,
3. THu FRENCH INSTrrUTIONALISTS 99 (A. Broderick ed. 1970).
4. Id. at 265.
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and they are irreducible to psychological or interpsychological realities." 5
Thus, institutions as unlike as the family and organized international society
have an incontestable natural foundation in an observable reality.
An institutional conception of law thus means
* . . a conception of juridical reality that, applied to foundations
and groups, brings out the fundamental role of the directing idea;
applied to the study of the legislative act, emphasizes its nature as
an "incarnate idea"; and finally, applied to contract, explains its
true nature, shows that it is not a simple balance between two wills
but that it too is institutional in nature and gravitates around an
organizing idea.6
Law is never merely the manifestation of will. Thus, an analysis of the
realities themselves, a study of the internal structure of the juridical act,
definitively casts subjectivism and voluntarism outside the domain of the
philosophy of law.
Right and duty manifest themselves when reason fulfills its
proper office and, considering the beings in question, judges what
their reciprocal relationships should be in order to conform to
their nature. Reason then discerns an order of natural balance,
that is, an order of justice that is founded not on arbitrary subjec-
tive evaluations but on the objective value of beings. Law is born
when reason is no longer content with simply verifying the nature
of beings but draws normative consequences from them. The jurist
is a sociologist who adds to his preoccupations a concern for
order.
7
Positive law, Delos explains, is the normative expression of the social
order of justice and balance. The order of justice is then truly a societal
order, and every act of justice performed by an individual realizes an "ele-
ment" of the social order.
The institutionalized conception of law is purposeful and dynamic. It
sees positive law as intent upon achieving human group aims in a process of
development. The juridical rule is neither a deductive concept nor the ar-
bitrary and subjective decision of a judge. Rule and social reality are inter-
related. Law develops from the society which takes priority to it and to
which it is ultimately subservient. The rule of law is not a purely formal
reality; it is a social form, a social manner of behavior expressed in positively
juridical terms.
This brief outline fails to do justice to the profundity of legal analysis at-
tained by the French institutional jurists. Time and again the perceptive in-
5. Id. at 233.
6. Id. at 252.
7. Id. at 261.
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sight of these men rises to be captured in application to contemporary prob-
lems of right and order, due process, judicial prospectivity, and rapidly ex-
panding vistas of domestic and international law. One senses in agreement
with the editor the similarity between Myres McDougal's "goal-thinking" and
Hauriou's institutional unfolding of the directive idea. One might also spec-
ulate about the influence of Frangois G6ny, Renard's dean at Nancy, on
American jurisprudence through Benjamin Cardozo's frequent citation of him
in The Nature of the Judicial Process. Beneath Renard's and Delos' use of
the scholastic categories of matter and form, substance and accident, foreign
to the ken of most American jurists, one discovers a concern similar to
Freund's impatience with one-dimensional thinking and his aspiration that
the courts serve as "the conscience of the country."
The evolution of legal rights need not only mean the explicitation of new
demands upon society nor even the unfolding of natural law through pro-
gressive applications as "the evolution of human life brings to light new neces-
sities in human nature that are struggling for expression."9 As Albert Brod-
erick, the editor of this volume, has ably demonstrated elsewhere, the in-
sight of the French institutionalists may well transcend the naked individual-
ism of Locke and also the static conceptualism of latter-day exponents of an
objective natural law.10 Providing a broader empirical base of observation,
it gives a more convincing legal analysis of the present scene.
The French Institutionalists appears as volume VIII in the Twentieth
Century Legal Philosophy Series published under the auspices of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools. With glossary and comments by Jean Br~the
de la Gressaye, Andr6 Hauriou, Bernard G6ny and Marcel Waline, it will
stand as an exemplary work of comparative jurisprudence.
8. P. FREUND, supra note 1, at 115, 196.
9. J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHs 313 (1960).
10. See Broderick, Evolving Due Process and the French Institutionalists, 14 CATHO-
LIC U.L. REv. 136 (1964); Broderick, Rights, Rhetoric and Reality: A New Look at
Old Theory, 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 133 (1969).
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